CHINA’S EDUCATION EXCHANGE DIPLOMACY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC IN COMPARISON WITH THAT OF THE U.S. AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA

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Abstract: Education exchange has increasingly been identified as an integral overtone in China and U.S. foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific. Legitimate but soft attributes rationalize its prominence though its effects are long-term and seemingly intangible. To win the “hearts and minds” of regional people, China and the U.S. have deployed this public diplomacy tool but differently. This article discusses the criticality of government-initiated education exchange within China and U.S. national strategies and their practice in the Asia-Pacific from a comparative perspective. It asserts that education exchange is well-situated within the two giant powers’ foreign affairs management toolkit to rejuvenate and reinforce their images in the region. Chinese initiatives prove adaptable to the region, whereas the U.S. disregards regional variations. However, it does not imply that China would utilise the education exchange tool more effectively than the U.S. Insights into their practice of education exchange diplomacy suggest some implications for China.

Keywords: exchange diplomacy, Asia-Pacific, China and the U.S

1. Introduction

The Asia-Pacific has been crucial to the diplomatic strategies of its neighbour – China and of another Pacific nation – the U.S. due to its strategic importance. Besides the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has employed a range of public diplomatic tools across the region through a diverse range of informational, cultural, financial, elite-to-elite, and exchange diplomatic activities to tighten its bilateral ties with regional countries (Custer et al, 2018, pp. 1,3). On the other end of the globe, for its “inextricable link” with the region (U.S. Department of Defense, 2019, p. 2), the U.S. has also implemented a multi-faceted approach to the recently re-defined Indo-Pacific. Its diplomatic relations with the regional countries are regarded as critical as its security partnership with them in the U.S. rebalance (Carter, 2018, pp. 16-17). Meanwhile, the “bedrock” of all relationships is trust, asserted Brown (Mc CLory et al., 2019, p. 105). China and the U.S. have long initiated government-funded exchange programs to build and sustain trust among grantees and their wider networks and ultimately transform it into partnerships. Grantees are immersed in the authentic cultural and social milieu in a host country, so the truthfulness of an intended message is softly reinforced. Moreover, compared to other traditional and non-traditional diplomatic tools, exchange programmes could wield more durable and transformational effects (Brown in Mc CLory et al., 2019, p. 106).

Unlike the U.S., the world’s first-ranking soft power in education (Mc CLory et al., 2019),

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China, as a player in the top 30, has adopted a more “breathable” approach that fits the country’s abundant financial resources and adapts to the Asia-Pacific regional conditions. The discussion of existing literature on China’s and U.S. translation of education “diplomacy inputs into its desired ends” (Custer et al., 2018, p. 1) hereunder will suggest some implications to improve the effectiveness of Chinese educational exchange diplomacy as a foreign affairs management tool. As defined by Cull, exchange diplomacy is a state “actor's attempt to manage the international environment by sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period of study and/or acculturization” (2008, p. 33). However, this paper examines the Chinese and U.S. governments’ sponsorship of inbound instead of outbound exchange. It approaches educational exchange as a foreign affairs management tool rather than from the soft power perspective though soft power is the resource and target of the tool.

2. Education Exchange as a Foreign Policy Tool

China’s recent maritime claims in the Asia-Pacific region have inevitably “casted a long shadow in its backyard” (Custer et al., 2018, p. 1) while international publics’ opinions and behaviours have increasingly mattered to its foreign policy (d’Hooghe, 2005, p. 88). This urges Chinese leaders to seek a measure to soften their country’s image overseas and envisage it as “a socialist cultural superpower” (Shambaugh, 2015, p. 99). In the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, President Xi Jinping made the country’s soft power enhancement a national goal. China has, in fact, made endeavours to “rejuvenate” its image as a friendly, reliable, and cooperative neighbour of the Asia-Pacific countries (d’Hooghe, 2005, p. 88). Within its “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, promotion of people-to-people ties is one of the five priorities besides trade and investment facilitation measures, infrastructure development, industrial and sub-regional economic cooperation, and financial cooperation (Li, 2015). China has employed multiple public diplomacy outreaches to foreign publics, which embrace people-to-people exchange, cultural symposia and information broadcasting (Custer et al., 2018, p. 1). Student exchange was an instrument to restore China’s pre-eminence after a “century of humiliation” since Hu Jintao presidency and is crucial to fulfilling President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” (Dervin et al., 2018; Xinhua, 2014, as cited in Custer et al., 2019, p. 4). Chinese government scholarship programs form a part of China’s official development assistance (ODA) rather than a relational foreign public engagement means (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 156). They assist grantees in receiving higher education and training and conducting research opportunities whilst gradually building up a reservoir of goodwill among this cohort.

Educational exchange together with cultural exchange are the positive forces in transnational affairs, articulated Snow (2009, p. 235). It is much more crucial to a nation’s security than hydrogen bombs or the Strategic Defense Initiative (Fulbright, 1987, p. 10). As a public diplomacy program, it involves long-term relationship building to facilitate a country’s foreign policy roll-out overseas (Nye, 2004, p. 107). Education exchange is government-sponsored, thus serves a country’s foreign policy goals (Snow, 2009, p. 233). International exchange enhances a freely reciprocal interchange of information and viewpoints between foreigners who go on an exchange to another country and its local people (Nye 2008, 103; Scott-Smith, 2009, pp. 51-52). Exchange participants’ independence from direct political interference during their immersion in local cultural milieu makes them legitimate source of opinion and judgement after their grant completion (Scott-Smith, 2009, p. 53). Hence, this is ideally exercised under minimal sponsors’ control (Snow, 2009; Metzgar, 2017). Nonetheless, some scholars, including Frankel, are not convinced by the optimistic outcomes of exchange diplomacy and argue that they are “emotionally-driven myths” (Snow, 2009, p. 235).
Educational exchange goals were first itemized in the U.S. Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948 and later in the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. They encompass: 1) deepening mutual understanding between the Americans and the people of other countries; 2) strengthening the ties between the U.S. and other countries; and (3) promoting international cooperation for peaceful relations between the U.S. and the other countries worldwide” (Title 22, Chapter 33, Section 2451). Within U.S. and ASEAN Plans of Action for 2011-2020 period, exchange initiatives, particularly the Fulbright U.S.-ASEAN Programme and the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI), are regarded as a means to strengthen their partnership and promote understanding and studies of the U.S. and the regional countries (ASEAN, 2011, p. 12; ASEAN, 2015, p. 12).

China Scholarship Council (CSC, n.d.), a non-profit institution affiliated with the Ministry of Education (MoE) and responsible for administration of Chinese government scholarship (CGS) programs since 1997, also pronounces a shared vision with the U.S. The Chinese government envisions the influential sphere of education exchange going beyond education, deepening mutual understanding and strengthening ties of friendship between the Chinese and people worldwide. This forms a foundation for broader Sino-foreign collaborations in multiple facets. International students from ASEAN countries connect their home and China and are the future of that relationship, stated ASEAN-China Center secretary-general Yang Xiuping (The Jakarta Post, 2016). China MoE with an aspiration to enhance the country’s “international status, influence, and competitiveness” plans to increase its financial sponsorship to assist more international students from other developing countries and diversify its beneficiaries (2010, p. 35). Exchange milieu in China is said to familiarize exchangers from the Asia-Pacific with its political and professional beliefs and ideals and daily communication with local people creates a cadre of “willing interpreters and receivers” (Nye, 2004, p. 16; Custer et al., 2019, p. 4). These today intercultural exchangers are potentially future leaders or opinion influencers in their home countries (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 162; Scott-Smith, 2009, p. 53; Custer et al., 2019, p. 27).

Zhang et al. (2003) disclosed that at least over 30 CGS exchange alumni have held ministerial-levelled positions, more than 20 have acted as ambassadors, over 30 as counsellors to China and over 200 have become (associate) professors at universities in their home countries worldwide (as cited in Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 162). In addition, many others have worked for other foreign embassies in China and engaged in a myriad of cooperation activities (Dong & Chapman, p. 162). However, these figures are not entirely as strong as the U.S. exchange alumni. There have been over 1,800 alumni ministers, 26 current foreign ambassadors to the U.S., 24 working in their countries’ Supreme Court, 85 Nobel laureates, over 110 Pulitzer Prize winners and 42 Forbes “30 Under 30” awardees (ACPD, 2009, p. 42). Funding exchangers from the Asia-Pacific, the Chinese government is motivated by two desires: gathering greater favourability among them in the short-term and forming a closer alignment with these potential “opinion leaders” to create a receptive milieu for its foreign policies (Custer et al., 2019, p. 37). This non-coercive means is expected to assuage the anxiety of a China threat (Myungsik & Elaine, 2018, p. 52). Exchange effect might spill over into the alumni’s social and professional networks due to their interpretation of knowledge, experience and expertise gained overseas to them (Scott-Smith, 2009, p. 53; Metzgar, 2017). Hence, candidate selection and these intercultural interpreters’ satisfaction with their exchange determine the success of exchange overtures.

3. Key Players in Educational Exchange

Both the Chinese and U.S. governments entrusted their embassies overseas and a
specialized institution with participant selection and administration of exchange activities. As mandated by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs’ (ECA, n.d.) mission is to cultivate “mutual understanding between the people of the U.S. and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange that assist in the development of peaceful relations” (ECA, n.d.). The Bureau is identified with a diplomatic role and is a U.S. foreign policy tool rather than a provider of U.S. government educational or development assistance. It aims at improving U.S. foreign relations, strengthening its national security, and advancing U.S. international influence through “flexible, responsive exchange programs” (ECA Bureau Functional Strategy 2018-2020). The Bureau’s visions are in line with the values of “fairness, equity and inclusion” which the U.S. promote worldwide. Aware of exchange alumni’s “opinion leader” effects on U.S. global competitiveness, the ECA gives priority to the support for their professional development and gaining leverage over alumni networks.

China’s similarly functioning body to the ECA is the Chinese Scholarships Council (CSC, n.d.). It is a non-profit institution entrusted by the MoE and responsible for the recruitment of and operational supports for CGS recipients since 1997 (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 160; UNESCO and UNESCO Bangkok, 2013, p. 22). Similar to the ECA, the CSC builds partnerships with local educational institutions and foreign counterparts for student and scholarly exchange and publishes exchange program annual assessment reports (Custer et al., 2019, p. 27). However, the CSC is not regarded as a diplomatic organ advancing its national foreign policy, but seemingly a pure academic exchange administrative body. Instead, 480 Confucius Institutes (CIs) in six global continents (UCLA Confucius Institute, n.d.) (known as Hanban) have promoted the understanding of Chinese language and culture worldwide and facilitated trust in China (CRS, 2008, p. 27; Custer et al., 2018, p. 27). Whilst the ECA was founded in U.S. “hegemonic mindset” to engage the global youth with exchange activities and spread its country’s values (Roach, 2018), CIs rely on China’s cultural richness to influence public opinion toward the country. Though established under joint agreements between educational institutions in host countries and in China, CIs are “dictated” by the MoE. This provokes a “backlash” against their pedagogic, content, and operational dependence and China’s selling an ideology (CRS, 2008, p. 27; Nguyen, 2014; Custer et al., 2018, p. 27; Roach, 2018).

The ECA administers Fulbright Programs, English language, citizen exchange, and student leader programs while U.S. embassies manage the U.S. Speakers Program (CRS, 2008, p. 24). It remains independent from U.S. embassies and consulates which are closely linked with the U.S. government (Roach, 2018). Chinese embassies take a similar role of promoting government-sponsored exchange opportunities among students from the Asia-Pacific (Custer et al., 2019, p. 27). However, China MoE takes much more control over national education system than the U.S. Department of Education. It interferes into national curriculum, textbooks at all levels, including tertiary education and manages state budget for inbound international student exchange (Custer et al., 2019, p. 27). This might have had negative impact on the recruitment of CGS program participants as its education suffers from education quality and pedagogic method reputations such as memorization and content censorship (Albert, 2018).

4. China’s and U.S. Practice of Education Exchange in the Asia-Pacific

U.S. education exchange was initiated in 1940 with 130 Latin American journalists invited to the U.S. (ECA, n.d.). A decade later, a batch of 33 students from East European countries came to the Tsing-hua University (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 159). There were 88,000 recipients of CGSs during 1950-2000 period (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 160). The number of
CGS grantees has sharply increased and the 2018 figure almost doubled the 2013 while that of U.S. sponsored exchangers remained stable around 16,000 following the peak of over 21,000 in 2013 (Figure 1). With respect to financial budget, Chinese government funded 469 million dollars in 2018, whereas the U.S. sponsored 230 million dollars in 2018 (Kennedy, 2018; ACPD, 2019, p. 44). CGS (2010) figures have reflected China MoE’s medium and long-term national strategy goals to promote and upgrade its international exchange and cooperation. Asian CGS awardees normally make up roughly 50% of the total number (3,076 over 6,153 in 2003 and 8,409 over 18,245 in 2009) (China MoE, 2006; UNESCO & UNESCO Bangkok, 2013, pp. 22-23). Some Chinese provinces have recently initiated scholarship funds to attract ASEAN students to their higher education institutions (ICEF Monitor, 2016).

CGSs for degree pursuers substantially outnumber U.S. scholarships (Figure 1). 40% of degree pursuers in China received some level of financial support from the Chinese government in 2015 (159,000 students, ICEF Monitor, 2016). This reflects the Chinese Education Committee’s aspiration to raise the effectiveness of CGSs by recruiting more advanced degree students (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 160) and complies with the MoE’s plan to attract and collaborate with high-level professionals (2010, pp. 3-4). Meanwhile, the number of U.S. sponsored degree pursuers remains stable around 3,000-4,000 and reached 6,400 once in 2012 (Institute of International Education). Le’s research outcomes (2019) highlighted that there existed a positive link between degree pursuit and Vietnamese exchangers’ academic and social experiences in the U.S. which were significantly and positively associated with their understanding and favourability of the host country. This partly rationalizes Chinese government’s exchange participant recruitment strategy.

**Figure 1**

*Chinese and U.S. Government Scholarships Granted to International Students, 1999-2018¹*

Of nine full and partial Chinese government scholarships to support degree pursuers launched in 2014 are two schemes which target at those from ASEAN and Pacific countries (China Scholarship Council, 2014). China/AUN Scholarship Program and China/Pacific Islands

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¹ Data for U.S. Government Scholarships draw upon the Institute of International Education’s publish data on “Primary Source of Funding of International Students” and the ACPD reports in 2014, 2017 and 2019.

Forum (PIF) Scholarship Program are initiated to attract the influx of students from the Asia-Pacific and enhance mutual understanding and friendly relationships between the Chinese and the regional publics. One of the achievements of President Barack Obama’s Rebalance strategy to the Asia-Pacific was advancing people-to-people ties (The White House, 2015). The Fulbright U.S.-ASEAN Visiting Scholars initiated in 2012 and the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative in 2013, which genuinely aimed to strengthen the U.S. ties with the ASEAN, reaffirmed U.S. strategic priority of and long-term commitment with the region (U.S. Mission to ASEAN, n.d.).

Besides the government scholarships dedicated to ASEAN students, they benefited from a wide array of academic and cultural exchange schemes sponsored by the Chinese and U.S. governments. Other non-degree and short-term exchange programs are Learners for the Chinese Language (one or two school years), HSK Winner scholarships (one year maximum), one 6-week grant for Chinese foreign teachers and up-to-5-month awards for researchers of Chinese culture (CSC, n.d.). The diversity of CGSs is not comparable to that of U.S. government scholarships, but their degree and non-degree program duration is generally much longer than U.S. grants. Nearly 40 degree and non-degree exchange programs sponsored by the U.S. government vary in duration and target at diversified age and professional expertise groups (ACPD, 2014). International Ph.D. students are funded by the Chinese government for up to four years, master’s students for three years and undergraduates for five years. Meanwhile, master’s degree pursuers are sponsored for maximum two years under the Fulbright Foreign Student Program, the longest U.S. sponsored scheme and non-degree exchange participants are financed 10 months maximum and 1 day minimum (ACPD, 2014). With longer duration and bigger number of grant recipients than the U.S. scholarships, CGSs undoubtedly bring Chinese country, culture, customs, and values to a myriad of intercultural communicators. China MoE’s interest in granting long-term scholarships to international students might be worthwhile. Myungsik and Elaine discovered that 25% more of those with 2-3 years of experience in China reported their favorability of the country than those on shorter exchange schemes (2018, p. 63). In Le’s study (2019), duration effect was mediated through degree pursuit. Degree pursuers whose stay in the U.S. was longer than non-degree exchangers were more involved in academic and cultural activities, gained more understanding of and developed a more positive attitude toward the host country than their counterparts.

While the U.S. government relies on the ECA and embassies overseas to recruit international students, the Chinese engages all forms of school. Roughly 100 CIs were founded in Asia-Pacific countries during 2014-2018 and centred most in South Korea, Thailand, and Japan (Custer et al., 2019, p. 35), which are in top 10 countries of origin of international students in China (Statista Research Department, 2020). Domestically, exchange and collaboration between Chinese and international primary, middle, and vocational schools through joint schools or projects are encouraged (China MoE, 2010, pp. 34-35). China signed bilateral cooperative agreements with the governments and partnerships with the institutions of 16 Asia-Pacific countries by 2010 (Custer et al., 2019, p. 34). Its top three partners were Australia (63 agreements and partnerships), Japan (46) and Singapore (49). However, strong institutional bonds with those developed countries did not correlate with a massive influx of students to China from these countries (China MoE, 2011). This might compel China MoE’s long-term recruitment strategy shift to developing countries (MoE, 2010, p. 35).

In the form of an ODA, CGS is more adaptable to the Asia-Pacific economic and educational conditions than U.S. exchange schemes (CRS, 2008, p. 2). It aims to financially support recipients’ getting access to higher education, conducting research or receiving Chinese
language training in China (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 156). This explains why CGSs do not regard candidates’ academic merit and leadership attributes as important as U.S. scholarships do despite their association with the future “opinion leader” effects of exchange programs. In a larger scale, China’s public diplomacy message is also adjusted to global regions (d’Hooghe, 2005). While it brands a China with respect of human rights in Europe and in the U.S., the “China’s Peaceful Rise” is communicated to Asia. Chinese foreign assistance is welcome in developing countries as it prioritizes development and does not impose standards policy or government performance for them (CRS, 2008, p. 2). Meanwhile, counter-terrorism and advancing democracy are the objectives of U.S. foreign aid and certain criteria including free market are required (CRS, 2008, p. 4). U.S. exchange schemes serve as a reinforcement of its diplomatic relationship with foreign countries. The Fulbright Program does not reach the countries with which the U.S. has not built official diplomatic relationships (ACPD, 2019, p. 45). By contrast, China considers scholarships as a tool to “jump-start” interest in China as an education destination among those from the Asia-Pacific (Custer et al., 2019, p. 29). Recent survey and research outcomes have supported the Chinese government’s seeking to build relationships with developing countries through exchange diplomacy. China is embraced more by citizens of developing countries with lower-performing economies and less sense of democratic values than China than by those in more advanced countries (Chu et al., 2015; BBC World Service, 2017; Myungsik and Elaine, 2018; Pew Research Center, 2019; Tang et al., 2020). Furthermore, China enhances CGS impacts by supporting its alumni with job seeking upon grant completion and building strong alumni networks (Myungsik & Elaine, 2018, p. 66). There, in fact, exists a positive connection between being employed and CGS recipients’ sympathetic attitude towards the host country (Chu et al., 2015, p. 413).

5. Asia-Pacific Public Opinion of China

Chinese exchange diplomacy has two-layered objectives: obtaining favourable public opinion among the Asia-Pacific public and aligning potential leaders with China’s foreign policy interests (Custer et al., 2019, p. 4). This paper first examines exchangers’ experience in China since their sentiments on the country and their willingness to interpret their exchange experience and knowledge of China to their nationals are largely contingent on their exchange satisfaction (Scott-Smith, 2009, pp. 51-53; Myungsik & Elaine, 2018, p. 62). Then, it discusses the achievements of CGS goals, which encompass gaining recipients’ support for China’s multiple facets and regional people’s “hearts and minds”.

5.1. International Exchangers’ Sentiments on China

China’s exchange overture has made a good progress in improving exchangers’ experience (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 157). Up to 77% of international exchangers reported their satisfactory experience (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 165). Nonetheless, more students from developing countries than those from highly developed ones were content with their experience in China (Myungsik & Elaine, 2018, p. 64). A majority of international students from the Asia-Pacific uphold a view that CGSs with full tuition fees, stipends for travelling, accommodation and living costs are more generous than other government-funded scholarships (Custer et al., 2018). Chinese government’s Ph.D. full scholarship in 2014 was, on average, equivalent to four rural Chinese households’ annual income (Myungsik & Elaine, 2018, p. 55). However, living allowance seemed insufficient for those in big cities, which caused their negative living experiences (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 166; Myungsik & Elaine, 2018, p. 62). Nearly 50% of respondents to Latief and Lefen’s questionnaires agreed that CGSs could cover daily expenses,
but not traveling home or to other Chinese provinces or cities (2018). Indeed, CGSs after adjusting for purchasing power parity, were only equivalent to a half or two-thirds of other scholarships offered by developed nations such as Australia Awards, UK Chevening, and U.S. Fulbright Program (Custer et al., 2019, p. 32).

Goldman found that international students’ dissatisfaction with their exchange experiences also resulted from daily communication with international student affairs staff at university (1965, as cited in Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 157). Failure in peer interactions and the feelings of being unwelcome by Chinese students and faculty were also predictors of CGS recipients’ satisfaction (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 165). Disclosed by Dong and Chapman, worries about logistical issues and safety were linked with international exchangers’ experiences (2008, p. 169). The displeasure suggests that China still has rooms for improvement with respect to international student services at university. Furthermore, students were not satisfied with the lack of freedom in exchanging ideas, particularly on democracy and human rights and over-supervision (Chen, 1965, as cited in Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 157). Despite improvement, pedagogy and education curriculum were still sources of concern for CGS grantees (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 167). In Latief and Lefen’s study (2018), roughly 70% of survey respondents felt fulfilled with them.

In general, China is generous in sponsoring international students; however, it has apparently not done well in providing inputs for exchange impacts. This can be improved by both the Chinese government and host institutions and exchangers themselves. Personal efforts largely shaped exchangers’ engagement in cultural and academic activities, embrace of the host country and acting as a transmitter of knowledge and experience to their networks later (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 170). This suggests academic merit and leadership be selection criteria.

30% more of CGSs (1,000 grants) were given to those from less politically free countries in the Asia-Pacific than their regional counterparts during 2000-2018 (Custer et al., 2019, p. 37). Top origins of Chinese government funded international students were Thailand, Cambodia and Laos, which are either partly free or not free (Freedom House, n.d.). Moreover, the countries with lower GDP per capita than China received roughly 5,600 scholarships more than their opposite group (Custer et al., 2019, p. 37). These reflect the Chinese government’s nation branding strategy targeting at developing economies with low freedom level and economic performance. These countries normally find it difficult to satisfy the requirements of U.S. foreign assistance apparently. China obviously fills in the gap left by the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific.

Myungsik and Elaine’s survey outcomes disclosed that 22% more of respondents positively shifted their attitude about China after their exchange experiences (2018, pp. 64-65). It is noted that 90% of their respondents were from Africa and Asia and 62% were from poorer countries than China (Myungsik & Elaine, 2018, p. 55). Dong and Chapman found that almost all CGS recipients believed that the Chinese government’s exchange scholarship would play a role in promoting a long-term relationship between China and their home countries (2008, p. 167). These suggest that Chinese government’s provision of educational opportunities for the elites from developing countries had diplomatic leverage. Myungsik and Elaine also emphasized the division in post-grant sentiments on China among those with different political and economic national backgrounds. The ratio of positive and negative view holders among those from politically free countries was 2:1, whereas that among those from partly free and non-free countries was 3.4:1 and 2.6:1, respectively (Myungsik & Elaine, 2018, pp. 61-62). The divide was sharper among those from the more advanced economies than China and those from less developed countries. The former group’s ratio of favourable over unfavourable attitude was 1.7:1 whilst the latter group’s ratio was 4.1:1 (Myungsik & Elaine, pp. 61-62). These findings justify
the Chinese government’s oversize attention to those from disadvantaged backgrounds. Majorities of Asia-Pacific countries are identified with low income and freedom levels, which lends creditability to the assumption that the regional publics’ generalized orientation towards China is much similar to that of CGS grantees.

5.2. Asia-Pacific Public Opinion of China

It is uncertain that China’s educational exchange diplomacy exerts some impacts on the Asia-Pacific general public as there are no clues whether CGSs precede regional public opinion, or they are built upon existing goodwill for China. Added to that are the interfering factors that come from China itself (such as its economy and culture), exchangers’ personal efforts or U.S. economic relations with and military presence in the region. Reliant on existing survey data, this paper examines Asia-Pacific public’s favourability of China as a country, its general regional influence, economic influence, and its leadership. There remains a gap between how China and the regional people perceive it (McGiffert et al., 2009, p. 8). To some extent the U.S.’s attraction still surpasses China’s.

Compared with the 1990s, China’s image among global publics has sharply declined across regions (BBC World Service, 2017; Gallup, 2019). Although the Asia-Pacific public hold more negative attitude toward China than elsewhere in the world, a decline has persisted since 2002 (Pew Research Center, 2019, p. 12). To illustrate, Japanese people’s positive views of China dropped 41%, Indonesian people by 37% and South Korean public by 32% (Pew Research Center, 2019, p. 12). Meanwhile, the Pakistani continued to rate China positively during 2014-2017 period (BBC World Service, 2017, p. 36). That is the only shining point where the number of CGSs and China’s favourable ratings both increased. The Chinese government granted more scholarships to Pakistani students than any other Asians with 7,000 grants in 2017 (The Express Tribune, 2018). With the view that student exchange is an ideal means to strengthen Pakistan-China strategic partnership, the Chinese government decided to increase the number of scholarships for Pakistani students annually to 20,000 (Daur, 2019). Generally, China’s degrading image in the Asia-Pacific shows that the spill-over effects of exchange overture are not up to the Chinese policymakers’ expectation or if exist, the impacts have not been profound enough to counter the by-product of China’s aggressiveness in the region.

Chu et al. indicate that those that viewed their own country’s democracy level was more advanced than China inclined to rate China negatively (2015, p. 413), which was supported by Pew Global Survey (2019, p. 31). Japan and South Korea with 2018 Aggregate Freedom House scores of 94 and 86, respectively tended to hold more unfavourable views of China (Freedom House, n.d.; Pew Research Center 2018, p. 57). The scores of Indonesia and the Philippines (64 and 62, respectively) were lower than the above countries, but were much higher than China (14) (Freedom House, n.d.). Their general publics’ ratings of China were less critical than the Japanese and Filipinos. Pew survey also reveals that the stronger a country’s citizens viewed their economy in comparison with China, the less passionate their embrace of China was (2019, p. 30). Japan and South Korea whose GDP per capita was higher than that of China upheld a somewhat less positive attitude towards China than the Philippines, India, and Indonesia (Pew Research Center, 2019, p. 30). Japanese public’s unfavourable ratings of China were exceptionally high (78%) due to their long-standing sovereign dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. So far, the patterns of CGS grantees’ perception of their host country are similar to their national publics. China apparently still struggles for the Asia-Pacific public’s “hearts and minds” and lags behind the U.S. Roughly two-thirds or more survey respondents from Japan, the Philippines and South Korea named the U.S. as their most dependable ally (Pew Research Center, 2019, p. 12). While
mistrust in China’s rose, willingness to align with the U.S. were reported by 86% of Vietnamese, 83% of Filipinos and 61% of Singaporean (Tang et al., 2020, p. 29). Given China’s aggression in claiming its marine territory in the South China Sea, their suspicion of it was understandable (Tang et al., 2020, p. 37).

Regarding Chinese vs U.S. general influence, 47% of Asia-Pacific citizens considered China as the most influential power while 35% named the U.S. (ABS Wave III survey 2010-2012, as cited in Chu et al., 2015, p. 402). Compared with 2019, 8% more of regional people regarding China as the biggest political and strategic influencer (Tang et al., 2020, p. 17); however, its influence was often expressed as a concern (Chu et al., 2015, pp. 403-404; Tang et al., 2020, p. 17). By contrast, the U.S. lost prominence among 4% of the regional public (31% in 2019 and 27% in 2020) (Tang et al., 2020, p. 17). The decline was most visible among Thai and Malaysian people (Tang et al., 2020, p. 37). U.S. military presence in the region is welcome by the ASEAN countries but the superpower is said unwilling to understand their concerns and engage with them via diplomatic channels (CRS, 2008, p. 77). China has filled in this void by offering regional countries generous aids and investment and strengthening people-to-people ties with the region (CRS, 2008, p. 77). Laos, Cambodia, and Brunei, three countries with the regional top ratios of CGSs per 100,000 persons in 2018 (Custer et al., 2019, p. 31), are most optimistic about their future bilateral relations with China (Tang et al., 2020, p. 37). However, fewer people in the Asia-Pacific preferred strong economic ties with China than with the U.S. (26% vs. 64%) (Pew Research Center, 2019, p. 12). While the Japanese and South Korean supported their current economic relations with the U.S. much more than with China (Pew Research Center, 2019, p. 9), the Australian and Indonesian shared an opposite viewpoint (Pew Research Center, 2019, pp. 21-22). Pluralitys of Asia-Pacific tended to view Chinese investment in a sceptical light as they feared that their economies would be overdependent on the investor (Pew Research Center, 2019, pp. 5, 34).

Chinese leadership’s global approval slightly declined during 2012-2015 period, but jumped back to 34% in 2018 (Gallup Poll 2006-2018, as cited in Custer et al., 2019, p. 43). When global confidence in most global leaders’ performance has dropped, President Xi Jinping, in fact, seems to gain more approval than President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin (Ray, 2019). Most Filipinos (58%) believed that President Xi would do the right thing in world affairs, whereas majorities of South Korean and Japanese people expressed an opposite opinion (Pew Research Center, 2019, p. 37). The Chinese leadership is said to have “matched their rhetoric with action” and mobilized diversified supports from government bureaus, media networks, its people and international students to rejuvenate their international image (Custer et al., 2019, p. 47). Although gaining back some confidence in leadership, the overall favorability picture of China is still grey.

In general, a charming China is more welcome in the less developed countries associated with lower records of governments’ respect for freedom than in their counterparts. Targeting at these countries, China is realistic when building up a friendship on some existing goodwill other than on hatred. The negative correlation between Asia-Pacific countries’ economic status and civil liberties and their nationals’ ratings of China does exist among CGS exchangers. Yet to what degree exchangers’ post-grant actions have influenced their national publics’ opinion of China is not easy to quantify. Research results evidenced that most exchangers became more favorable of China after their experience in China. Hence, China has achieved its aim of aligning the future regional leaders with its foreign policy interests through education exchange overture. CGS alumni’s greater reservoir of goodwill and high record of prominent individuals have enabled their sponsor to believe that to some extent they have adopted favorable views of China.
in their decision making process. Notwithstanding, the degree to which these leaders have brought their experience, understanding, and approval of China into their work requires further research evidence.

6. Discussion

The employment of educational exchange is vital for China to “rejuvenate” its image in the Asia-Pacific. In response to the question “What can China do to improve relations with your country?”, 21% believed that China can enhance mutual understanding through people-to-people exchange (ASEAN Studies Centre and ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021, p. 38). However, there needs primary data that directly examines the correlation between exchange programmes and positive attitudes towards China (if any) and the mechanism of influence to firmly conclude the attitudinal effects of China’s exchange diplomacy. China’s image among the Asia-Pacific public is affected by a series of factors and in various ways (Custer et al., 2019, p. 42). They range from its emergence as a global economic superpower, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), its aggressiveness in territory claims, democratic ideas, culture, history, and education to the presence of other global powers in the region. Hence, the following suggestions do not attempt to directly target each of them, but generally to improve the effectiveness of its exchange diplomacy.

As CGSs form a part of China’s development aid to the developing countries and are aimed at assisting foreign students pursuing their higher education in China, it has given less emphasis on the scholarship recipients’ academic quality and leadership. Meanwhile, Scott-Smith concedes, exchanges “cannot be easily fine-tuned into a political instrument” and then selecting participants becomes critical as it helps reduce risks. In fact, these intercultural communicators’ efforts proved the most significant predictor of their satisfaction with their studying and living experience in China and their post-exchange positive perception towards their host (Dong & Chapman, 2008, p. 170). The more energies they devoted to their studies, the more engaged they were in cultural and academic pursuits, the more pleasant they found their experience in China, not to mention the more potential they have to become future elites and “opinion leaders”. Thus, at the core of China’s exchange diplomacy, there should be a clear distinction between an assistance and a diplomatic tool. If education exchange is a channel for China to support other less developing countries, quantity may be prioritized. However, if it is a public diplomacy tool, participants’ qualities are important as they decide its spill-over and long-term effects and China’s ability to set up alignment with future leaders.

The success of exchange diplomacy requires a comprehension among direct practitioners about their roles. Apart from the Chinese government’s generous scholarships and endeavours to internationalize its education system, universities, a broad context in which exchange participants have daily communication and expose to Chinese diversified aspects, play a role. International service staff seem to be at the forefront in gaining China’s attraction, hence they need to be professionally well-trained to understand their role in the whole process of wielding their country’s effects. In addition, it is not easy to search for a well-designed and published agenda to attract international students from Chinese universities, whereas they need to promote themselves in the international pool rather than giving a description. More than that, separating domestic and international students’ living accommodations has limited their opportunities to interact with each other, exchange ideas and mutual understanding deepening. Festivities during international students’ experience in China enhance cultural exchange, but strong alumni networks also reinforce exchangers’ spirit, support each other, and spread their knowledge and experience to others after their grant completion. Either the China Scholarship Council or the
universities themselves should conduct students’ experience evaluation and exchange impacts’ assessment on a regular basis to understand their success and necessary adjustments.

7. Conclusion

China has proven its well-thought education exchange strategies and highly adaptable implementation approach than the U.S. It targets the participants from the less developing countries with lower record of freedom in the Asia-Pacific where there already exists a certain reservoir of goodwill for it, which enables exchange activities to win the general publics’ hearts. At the same time, instead of applying a set of criteria regarding human rights, individual freedom, and free markets to all targeting countries like the U.S., China has given priority to assisting the beneficiaries. Chinese education exchange has been effective in gaining more positive perceptions among the CGS recipients. Nevertheless, their “spill-over” effects on their home countries’ general publics have not been strong enough to balance against the negative influence of China’s actions and authoritarian regime. More assessment efforts to justify the spill-over effects resulting from CGSs are required. China’s strong economy and abundant financial resources can bring global exchange participants to the country, but China has had less control over their satisfaction with their experience and favourability of the country, let alone their interpretation of their experience and knowledge about China to their networks of contacts. Hence, China needs to envision exchange programmes as a diplomatic tool and prioritize merit and leadership in grant recipient selection. Moreover, the country should upgrade its education system and facilitate scholarship recipients’ exposure to their culture and values. That necessitates the active engagement of the Chinese government’s bureaus and universities.

References


NGOẠI Giao TRáo ĐỐI GIÁO DỤC CỦA TRUNG QUỐC VỚI KHU VỰC CHÂU Á - THÁI BÌNH DƯƠNG TRONG SO SÁNH VỚI HOA KỲ VÀ MỘT SỐ HÀM Ý ĐỐI VỚI TRUNG QUỐC

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Tóm tắt: Trao đổi giáo dục ngày càng được xem là một công cụ không thể thiếu trong chính sách ngoại giao của Trung Quốc và Hoa Kỳ đối với khu vực châu Á - Thái Bình Dương. Tình hợp pháp và mẻ đeo đã lý giải vị thế của công cụ ngoại giao này, mặc dù công cụ có tác động trong dài hạn và khó để định rõ. Đã giải được câu “trái tim và khối óc” của người dân trong khu vực, Trung Quốc và Hoa Kỳ đã triển khai công cụ ngoại giao ngắn dài ngày nhưng theo những cách khác nhau. Từ góc độ so sánh, bài báo sẽ thảo luận vai trò của trao đổi giáo dục trong chiến lược quốc gia và thực tiễn áp dụng ngoại giao trao đổi của Trung Quốc và Hoa Kỳ tại khu vực châu Á - Thái Bình Dương. Bài báo khẳng định rằng trao đổi giáo dục có vị trí quan trọng trong chính sách đối ngoại của hai quốc gia nhằm mục đích cải thiện và củng cố hình ảnh trong khu vực. Trong khi Hoa Kỳ bò qua những khác biệt giữa các khu vực, Trung Quốc đã có những sáng kiến, thay đổi phù hợp giúp ngoại giao trao đổi của quốc gia này có khả năng thích ứng với khu vực. Tuy nhiên, điều đó không có nghĩa là Trung Quốc đạt được hiệu quả trong ngoại giao trao đổi đối hoa Kỳ. Từ việc thảo luận về chính sách và thực tiễn của ngoại giao trao đổi của hai quốc gia, tác giả sẽ đưa ra một số gợi ý nhằm cải thiện hiệu quả của ngoại giao trao đổi Trung Quốc.

Từ khóa: ngoại giao trao đổi, Châu Á - Thái Bình Dương, Trung Quốc và Hoa Kỳ