

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA RIVALRY AND ITS IMPACTS ON WASHINGTON AND BEIJING RELATIONS WITH HISTORICAL COMPLEXITY OF TAIWAN

Sigit^{1*}, Chindy Agata Bosawer², Rachel Shannon Twigivanya²

¹ *PhD Candidate in International Relation, Asia-Pacific Regional Studies,
National Dong Hwa University, Taiwan*

² *Researcher Assistant, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
Christian University of Indonesia, Indonesia*

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Abstract: This paper aims to analyze the United States and China rivalry which impacts their relationship with Historical Complexity of Taiwan using the Balance of Threat Theory and qualitative research method. Both the United States and China have different perspectives on the Taiwan issue. China considers that historically Taiwan is part of China. However, the disintegration that Taiwan faces makes some Taiwanese people not feel part of China. This incident was later used by the United States in intervening and expanding its influence in the East Asia region since the 1950s. As a result, the Taiwan area has become a battleground for the United States and China as they compete for regional influence. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979, provides Washington a legal framework to continue selling weapons to Taiwan. On the other hand, Beijing took the initiative to open a free market with Taipei under the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in 2013. This paper suggests that both Beijing and Washington have always refrained from escalating into an open conflict that ended in war. Thus, a future war is unlikely.

Keywords: the United States' TRA, China's CSSTA, Taiwan, historical complexity, East Asia

Introduction

In the geopolitical contestation in East Asia, the dynamics of the relationship between China and the United States are determined by the continuation of Taiwan's sovereignty. Unlike other countries on the international stage, Taiwan is not a sovereign political entity. In the global forum, Taiwan is positioned as a non-state economic entity (Hilpert et al., 2022). Therefore, despite its advanced economic development, Taiwan has unequal political

power with other countries. It is not surprising that Taiwan's movement in the global environment is largely determined by its relations with major world powers, such as China and the United States, the two countries with the most interest in the Taiwan Strait.

Historically, compared to the United States, China has longer ties with Taiwan. One of the factors is because the geographic locations of China (Mainland) and Taiwan are close together, only separated by the Taiwan Strait. However, historical and

* Corresponding author.

Email address: sigitcandrawiranatakusuma89@gmail.com

geographic proximity does not appear to be directly proportional to political and economic closeness. In contrast to communist China, Taiwan chose democracy in line with the United States. Since its inception, Taiwan has adopted a similar economic system to the United States. This situation makes Taiwan seem to be squeezed into two contradictory global powers. However, the two global powers have strategic interests with Taiwan. China and the United States have their own interests to influence Taiwan.

To China, Taiwan is its lost island. Various wars in the past made Taiwan repeatedly experience integration and disintegration with China. China's leaders believe that Taiwan's reunification with China will make this country bigger and stronger. Therefore, the unification of Taiwan with China is a big dream and the Presidents of China, including Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. In the centenary of the Nationalist Revolution that brought down the monarchy in Beijing on October 10, 2011, Hu Jintao as the former president of the People's Republic of China claimed that "China and Taiwan should end antagonisms and heal their wounds of the past". Hu Jintao encouraged both countries to work together in order to achieve reunification in a peaceful way that aims to "serve the fundamental interests of all Chinese, including our Taiwan compatriots" (AP et al., 2011). Two years later, Xi Jinping who replaced Hu Jintao as President affirmed his desire for unification because "both sides of the (Taiwan) strait are family" (Wang, 2013). On the other side, the intervention conducted by the United States has hampered China's efforts to unite Taiwan in its territorial areas. The Enactment of Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 1979 provides a legal framework for Washington to help arm and protect Taiwan without establishing formal diplomatic relations. This fact shows the conflicting interests between the United

States and China and have caused Taiwan to become the battle arena for the two global powers, thus adding complexities to the Taiwan Issue. Based on the background, this paper will analyze **how the rivalry of the two major powers, the United States and China, will impact the relationship between the two countries in the historical complexity of Taiwan.**

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, this paper briefly explains the concept used in discussing the research question, which is the balance of threat theory proposed by Stephen Walt. Then, the first part of the discussion section explains the historical review of Taiwan, especially how China could claim it from the start. The next section examines Taiwan's relationship with the United States and China. Then, going to the main points of the discussion, this paper continues on explaining how the United States started to intervene in the Cross-Strait Relation which caused the complexity of Taiwan issue. The next section discusses China's action towards its policy against the United States and also Taiwan. In the last part of the discussion, this paper provides a brief explanation about the United States and China's perceptions towards Taiwan. The last section of the paper offers a conclusion.

Conceptual Framework

In order to understand how the United States and China rivalry impacts their relationship with the historical complexity of Taiwan, this paper will use the balance of threat theory that was modified from the realism theory of International Relations. The balance of threat theory assumes that a country will prevent the domination of another country's power by balancing the power of other countries in order to oppose it (Ababakr, 2021). Furthermore, Stephen Walt's idea on the theory of balance of threat assumed that a state did not react to the

strength of other countries, but to threats (Bock & Henneberg, 2013).

In the concept balance of threat theory, according to Walt (1987), there are various indicators that affect and perceive a country as a source of threat, such as (i) aggregate strength which is the total resources of a country. In this case, depicting a country the greater the aggregate power brings great potential and the greater the state threat can arise; (ii) geographical proximity refers to the distance between the threatened country. The greater the distance, the more limited it is in projecting the power of the state so that the potential threat will be more limited and vice versa; (iii) offensive capability refers to the combination of aggregate strength, geographic proximity and aggressive action. The greater the offensive from a country, the greater the threat that arises, and (iv) perceptions of a country's threat to the aggressiveness of another country, because the more often a country shows aggressive actions with its strength, the greater the perceived threat to that country.

In dealing with threats, the hedging strategy is the right method to be used by every country. The hedging strategy that Kuik (2008) has developed describes it as a behavior in which a country acts in response to threats by pursuing policy options that combine balancing and bandwagoning strategies to produce a neutral effect under a situation full of uncertainty and high risk. This strategy can be seen through elements of economic dependence and security cooperation. Kuik (2008) also stated that a major contribution to the development of the hedging strategy is through the introduction of risk-contingency and return-maximizing options. In the concept of balance of threat, there are three pieces of advice that describe the nature of the state in the international system. First, external balance against threats is more likely because a country that has power will involve threatening actors,

through various incentives, as a substitute for a more rigorous approach such as a counterweight. Second, balancing against threats is more likely to take place outside the country facing regional military threats than political or ideological threats. Third, the State poses a threat to regional level threats even when it conflicts with the balance of power at the global level.

Balance of threat theory then predicts the risks in seeing the activities of other interested countries to create power from various aspects. Risk-contingency in order to reduce certain risks, such as military or economic threats, that come from countries with aggressive powers. This option is more about balancing where to reduce risk, a country will choose to cooperate with a country that is not a source of threat. On the other hand, the return-maximizing option is an option to maximize the profits of the aggressive power. In this choice, it is more directed to the acceptance of the force of the threatening or bandwagoning state. When the choice is in risk-contingency, there are two options. First, indirect-balancing refers to increased military efforts to overcome the uncertainty of a threatening country, indirect-balancing refers to informal military action. Second, dominance denial is a choice to prevent the emergence of a dominant power from other state. In addition, to refuse the emergence of a dominant power from a threatening state. The threatened countries have to develop relations in strengthening diplomatic influence with other countries (Kuik, 2008).

Qualitative research was done with the balance of threat theory analysis of secondary data. Ababakr (2021) argues that the balance of threat theory knowing that states tend to be aggressive when threats come while the hedging strategy is the method that can be used by any state to survive from incoming threats. Both of these theory and strategy are parallel with the actions taken by the United States and China

in dealing with the Taiwan issue. Conflict does not always become a threat but a momentum to encourage cooperative relations to maintain interests. Countries will face a situation of chaos in the international system. So the countries carry out bilateral and multilateral relations and form allies to maintain conflict. In this context, China and the United States as actors who play an important role in the Taiwan conflict always take advantage of the momentum to protect and enhance their national interests. The United States prefer a soft power approachment through economic and cultural aspects. On the other hand, Taiwan considered its political system as a hegemonic country by looking for alliances and making choices that lead to denial of dominance. This illustrates that an influential country in this case, Washington will keep on developing relations in strengthening the influence of diplomacy.

Historical Review of Taiwan

Historically, Taiwan's connection with Mainland China dates back to when the region was first discovered in 230 during the Three Kingdoms period (220-280). After the Sui Dynasty (586-618) and Tang Dynasty (618-907), Chinese rule was established in the area called Yizhou Island. During the Song Dynasty (960-1279) and Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), Han immigrants, mainly from Fujian Province, began to arrive in Taiwan (Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council, 1998). In the era of Song Dynasty, China actively traded with Japan and countries in Southeast Asia, including the Middle East. However, the situation was conflicted when the Ming Dynasty fell (1366-1644). The Ming government withdrew its officials and evacuated Chinese immigrants from Taiwan. Maritime activities in Taiwanese territory were halted (Wills & Rubinstein, 1999).

At the same time, European imperialism was spreading to Asia. When Mainland China underwent a change of power from the Ming Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), Taiwan was occupied by the Dutch through its trading partners, the Dutch East India Company (1624-1662). The Netherlands used Taiwan as its market base to bring together traders from colonial countries with China and Japan. Feeling exploited by the Dutch, the Ming Dynasty rulers invaded Taiwan and captured the region in 1662. 21 years later, the Ming Dynasty was overthrown by the Qing Dynasty. At that time, Taiwan's population increased dramatically as the immigration program intensified. The population of Taiwan in the 1650s was only around 100,000 people, soaring up to 1.78 million in 1824 (Shepherd, 2016).

As Taiwan showed more significant development, the Qing rulers gave more attention to the island. However, these efforts were often interrupted by the intervention of foreign powers from Europe, attempting to control China in particular, and Asia in general. The Opium Wars (1856-1860), waged by the British and French, further weakened the strength of the Qing dynasty. Although the two European countries had landed their troops on the island of Taiwan, the Chinese military managed to expel them. However, this was not the case with Japan, successfully seizing Taiwan through the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895. Until 1945, Japan used Taiwan as a military base to send troops to Southeast Asia. At the same time, Japan massively and repressively erased the cultural roots of Taiwanese society by launching the "Japanization" program (Wang, 2013).

The repressive measures of 50 years in some ways changed the view of the Taiwanese people towards mainland China. Therefore, when Japan surrendered in World War II and was forced to hand Taiwan back to China in 1945, Nationalist government

had not completely taken over mainland China. Moreover, the Nationalist government did not seem to give much attention to the Taiwanese people. Instead of focusing on post-war restoration, the Nationalist government was more preoccupied by civil war with the Communists. As a result, there was a growing animosity and dislike towards China in Taiwan. The success of the Communist Revolution in 1949 resulted in the transfer of the Nationalist government from Beijing to Taipei, but it did not easily dispel this resentment (Wang, 2006). Although in its development, the Nationalist government in Taipei succeeded in encouraging Taiwan's economic progress, it still did not reduce the desire to separate from mainland China.

The 50 years of Japanese occupation (1895-1945) had a negative impact on Taiwan's relations with China. Although they were united for four years (1945-1949), the Communist Revolution resulted in reintegration. The United States' intervention since 1950 has exacerbated disintegration (Wang, 2006). Supported by the United States, the Nationalist government began to build the economy and develop Taiwan's democratic system. At that time, China experienced slow economic growth and continued to survive with its communist system. Taiwan experienced rapid economic development and grew into a democratic country. After being pressured by authoritarianism, the martial law policies implemented by the governments of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo (1949-1987), the Taiwanese people felt political freedom with the holding of direct presidential elections in 1996. In that first election, Lee Teng-hui from the Kuomintang Party (KMT) was elected as President.

Unlike the previous president, Lee Teng-Hui often travels to various countries to enhance Taiwan's international reputation. Not only holding informal

meetings with Southeast Asian leaders, former President Lee Teng-Hui also asked the United States to allow him to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Seattle in November 1993. This is an attempt to legalize Taiwan's status as a full member of an international organization. Lee Teng-Hui asked the United States to support Taiwan's right to be accepted as a member of international organizations, especially in relation to the economic agenda. The United States has responded positively in helping Taiwan gain membership rights by not requiring its members to become sovereign states (Suettinger, 2003). Furthermore, Lee Teng-Hui took advantage of Taiwan's economic progress as a bidder instrument for other countries to shift its recognition back from China to Taiwan. Lee Teng-Hui promised to disburse 1 billion USD if Taiwan was approved as a member of the United Nations (Tucker, 2009). Interviewed by the Washington Post in November 1997, Lee Teng-Hui stated that "Taiwan is already independent... Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country". Hence, since early 1998, Lee began speaking on behalf of Taiwan as an independent and sovereign state. He urged Beijing to place Taiwan and China as two equal political entities and not to place Taiwan as subordinate to China. For Lee Teng-Hui, the concept of "One Country, Two Systems" was only suitable for former British colonies, such as Hong Kong, not suitable in Taiwan (Tucker, 2009).

Although originally from the KMT, Lee Teng-Hui had the tendency to push Taiwan towards independence. Unsurprisingly, the pro-independence movement continues to develop. At the same time, the political position of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in favor of permanent separation from China grew. The strengthening of that position paid off in the 2000 Presidential election when the DPP won the election and installed Chen Shui-bian as President. After

being out of office for two terms, the KMT returned to power in 2008. Former Taipei mayor, Ma Ying-Jeou, was elected President twice and remains in control of the government. Unlike President Chen Shui-bian who took Taiwan away from China, Ma Ying-Jeou tried to strengthen Taiwan's relations with China.

One of the concrete forms of President Ma Ying Jeou's policy is the signing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) on June 21, 2013 in Shanghai. CSSTA is a trade pact between Taiwan and China to liberalize the service industry sector, including banking, health, tourism, film, telecommunications, and publishing. Under the agreement, Taiwan and China must open up Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between the two sides, which allows businessmen from each country to cross the Taiwan Strait freely. Taiwan will open 64 industrial sectors for Chinese investment, while China provides 80 industrial sectors for Taiwanese investment (Mo, 2013). Consequently, it is easier for Chinese companies to set up branch companies in Taiwan and vice versa. Worried about the adverse effects of CSSTA, when the parliament began discussing the ratification process of the agreement, students that led the pro-independence movement staged a large protest by occupying the Legislative Yuan building for days in March 2014. The demonstration, known as the Sunflower Movement, demanded the cancellation of CSSTA and was thought to increase Taiwan's dependence on China. However, President Ma Ying Jeou rejected the students' demands and maintained the free trade agreement. Ma Ying Jeou explained that "As Taiwan's economy relies heavily on foreign trade, the island is in urgent need of more free trade agreements" (Xinhua, 2014). Despite the failure, the Sunflower Movement succeeded in spreading an important message to the government that

the Taiwanese did not fully support Ma Ying Jeou's policies to strengthen ties with China. Consequently, Taiwanese society is divided into two camps, pro-independence and pro-China. Various historical momentum has colored the cross-strait relations, involving not only China but also the United States.

Taiwan and the United States Relations

Taiwan has had informal relations with the United States since 1979. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) is the agreement that provides the legal framework for the continuation of non-diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan (Chang, 2000). The primary purpose of the TRA legislation was to help maintain peace, security and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the United States' foreign policy by allowing for the continuation of commercial relations. The law further emphasizes that it is the policy of the United States to maintain its capabilities and to reject any attempts of violence or other forms of coercion that could jeopardize the security, social and economic systems of the people in Taiwan. In the end, the United States carries out arms sales to Taiwan, which aims to increase Taiwan's confidence in dealing with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The United States arms sales have contributed to maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and created a conducive atmosphere that enhances cross-strait relations (Chang, 2000).

Taiwan became a fully democratic country with its first direct presidential election in 1996, and today Taiwan enjoys a free press, free elections, stable democratic institutions and guarantees of human rights. As a result, Taiwan has received more support and respect in the United States. Washington and Taipei relationship began with trade activities that had grown impressively over the past twenty years, from 9.2 billion USD in 1979 to 51.2 billion

USD in 1998. Today, Taiwan is known as the seventh largest trading partner to the United States. Cultural relations between the United States and Taiwan have also deepened, scientific and technological exchanges are also frequent, and around 117 bilateral agreements, trade agreements, and memoranda of understanding help regulate relations between Taiwan and the United States. Despite its past successes, the TRA framework is in decline today compared to 1979, because the United States' stance does not match the content or spirit of the action. The TRA has had different failures, such as (i) on August 17, 1982, Sino-American Communique mentioned that "the United States does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China and that it intended to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan until the final resolution" (McClaran, 2000); (ii) a 1994 policy review to prohibit the United States visits by the top leadership of Taiwan; and (iii) the "three no's" pledge made by President Clinton to Beijing. The Sino-American Communique of August 17, 1982 stipulated that in terms of arms transfers, the United States would provide Taiwan with the necessary defense equipment and defense services to enable Taiwan to maintain adequate self-defense. The vague words sparked questions about who would decide what weapons would be sufficient for Taiwan's security.

The TRA contains explicit references to continuing the United States arms sales to Taiwan. It is a source of tension in the United States-China relations. The responsibility for determining Taiwan's security needs rests with the United States military, president and congress regardless of China authority. Moreover, George Bush' administration insisted on continuing arms sales to Taiwan after the United States-

China normalization in 1979 for three reasons. First, arms sales to Taipei will make Taiwan more confident in its defensive capabilities against China. Thus, it is unnecessary for Taiwan to panic or seek radical solutions such as nuclear options which are contrary to American interests. Second, continued arms sales to Taiwan could reduce suspicion and doubts from other allies in the region about the United States' reliability in meeting its defense commitments. Third, if Taiwan remains militarily strong, China is unlikely to launch an attack on Taiwan. However, under the order of the 1982, Beijing Communique stated that the United States government would reduce arms sales to Taiwan (Chang, 2000).

The United States perception on Taiwan issue is fundamentally different from the problem China has. One of the reasons why Taiwan is so important to the United States is of course ideological reasons. Washington strongly believes that democracy and prosperity at home depend on economic expansion and the promotion of democratic values, such as free markets, freedom, and human rights. To Washington, Taiwan is the only Mandarin-speaking place that enjoys democracy and American values. Although in 2011 Taiwan only had a population of 23 million people, it was the 10th largest trading country in the world. The success of Taiwan's transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy is believed to be a role model for China because it shows an alternative model to the Chinese communism (Kuntić, 2015).

Taiwan and China Relations

The relationship between China and Taiwan is one of the longest unsolved international political and security issues since the era of World War II. After the United States-China normalization in 1979 and under China's economic reforms and

democratization and globalization, Beijing and Taipei have built relationships that have increased economic interdependence and people-to-people relations. In addition, since Ma Ying-Jeou was elected president of Taiwan in 2008, political rapprochement has taken place in the Taiwan Strait, which was illustrated when President Ma Ying-Jeou met Chinese President Xi Jinping in Singapore in November 2015. But on the other side, neither China nor Taiwan has been able to overcome the problem, let alone resolve their political differences. Since 2007, China has prioritized cross-strait development, but did not recognize Taiwan's statehood. China has been threatening Taiwan's military to reunite with the Chinese terms, called "One Country, Two Systems" which is the same as Hong Kong and Macau (Cabestan, 2016). Furthermore, Beijing considers the guarantee given by the United States to Taipei, namely the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) as a hindrance to reunification purposes. But Taiwan's democratization since the late 1980s has reinforced its separate identity, engendered a pro-independence force and strengthened its desire to maintain the status quo, while normalizing its relationship with Beijing and enhancing its international status (Taiwan Relation Act, 1979).

In the 1990s, China experienced an unprecedented economic revival, military modernization, and increased nationalism that changed the strategic equation across the Taiwan Strait. The development of trade and economic relations across the Strait has created an increasingly harmonious relationship between China and Taiwan, which is increasingly dependent on China. This is due to increased defense spending and military modernization that has increasingly led to the People's Liberation Army (PLA), forcing the United States to reconsider its role in securing Taiwan. In the same year, Beijing adopted an "anti-

secession law", which is a law that legalizes the use of a "non-peaceful" way to reunite with Taiwan. Since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China's foreign policy has been stricter and concerned on their security, especially in the maritime area that has emphasized Taiwan and the United States.

Since the election of Ma Ying-Jeou and the Kuomintang (KMT) back to power in 2008, relations in the Taiwan Strait have improved considerably. Economic trade is growing rapidly, with bilateral trade increasing from 129 billion USD in 2008 to 199 billion USD in 2014, including in 2014 amounting to 152 billion USD of Taiwanese exports (IMF, 2021). Educational exchange and cooperation programs, culture and people-to-people relations are also growing rapidly. Likewise, economic relations and social interactions throughout the Taiwan Strait have contributed since Beijing and Taipei resumed relations in 2005, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) have held dialogues that seek to find common ground on some of the most politically sensitive issues, such as concluding a peace treaty or reducing military tensions in the Taiwan Strait (e.g. withdrawal of Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan) to stabilizing relations and to some extent enhancing the island's security. In late 2011, Ma Ying-Jeou announced that if he were re-elected, he would start his political negotiations to end hostilities or conclude a peace deal with Beijing, but those policies were later canceled by him.

Despite Ma Ying-Jeou's declared 'rapprochement' policy with China, polemics intervention remain. First, the reconciliation between the KMT and the CCP has strengthen Ma Ying-Jeou's policies by Taiwan's main opposition group, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the entire 'green camp' contested if there is no formal independence or the two lands are

separated by retaining full rights as a nation (Kan, 2014). Second, the economic benefits to Taiwan from rapprochement with China were neither visible nor evenly distributed. The policy has favored politically important sectors (such as fruit farming) and, in general, large companies over small businesses. Third, it looks to promote its economic and political ties with China, but sometimes Ma Ying-Jeou's government is also worried about China's interests. For example, he restricted the entry of Beijing's opponents into Taiwan, avoiding encounters with Chinese dissidents such as 'Barefoot Lawyer' Chen Guangcheng, who took refuge in the United States in 2012 (J. R., 2013).

During the eight-year tenure, President Ma Ying-Jeou and former Chinese President Hu Jintao have sought to build a close and warm relationship with the KMT government and the business people involved. In general, Xi Jinping's strategy towards Taiwan does not deviate from his predecessors. Xi Jinping continues to emphasize their economic and social relations, expanding relations with all segments of Taiwanese society, including the DPP and the independence-leaning green camp aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Taiwanese. For China, securing China's borders is a closely related goal. The CCP, however, cannot establish official relations with the DPP as long as the party still applies the 1992 Consensus and future resolutions of Taiwan 1999. Despite its patience, however, Beijing is doing everything in its power to integrate Taiwan into the mainland and narrow the island's room for maneuver. Beijing has never forgotten its ultimate goal in order to reunite with Taiwan (Cabestan, 2016).

The United States' Intervention Towards Cross Strait Relation

In this case, Taiwan and other great

powers other than China, the United States of course, become a container for protecting countries that do not have the power to maintain conflict and the existence of power. The international system has always been troubled by various polemics that are difficult to resolve. It is undeniable that Taiwan and the United States have a very strategic and comprehensive relationship from economic, military and geopolitical aspects. The consequences that Washington can face will certainly have a very significant impact on China.

In order to promote foreign policy as a strategy to achieve national interests, sustainable cooperation is required. The complexity of every state will make it seek consistency of intervention and conflict management by establishing and maintaining relations with other countries. In this case, Taiwan and the United States certainly have the opportunity to promote connectivity and cooperative relations as political interests. By prioritizing the foreign policy of containment and engagement, the United States has carried out harmonious cooperation to achieve political goals. Washington's relationship with Taipei is due to Taiwan's different political system from China and their similarities on political foundation, which are democracy and liberalism.

In the framework of the description, cross-straits relation is dependent on several factors, such as (i) international system factors; (ii) interaction factor between the two parts of the force; and (iii) domestic political factors related to cross-straits relations (Wu, 2013). Dealing with domestic political problems of course requires bilateral interaction between countries as holders of political power. The political condition of the international system in which the United States supports Taiwan influences its internal politics. The greater power dependence between Washington and Taipei will reduce the United States

intervention in Taiwan. In the condition of the international system which is uncertain, this could become a forum for countries to express their influence and strength in military, economic and diplomatic approaches. Dependence is the main problem that affects Taiwan's position. The United States' support towards Taiwan will influence China's degree of decision on the assertiveness of Taiwan's bureaucracy. It could affect Taiwan's leadership decision regarding the level of firmness that should be taken as a new policy for China's independence (Romberg, 2014).

However, in the case of Taiwan, the motive for the United States approach certainly causes Taiwan to feel dependent so that Taiwan can maintain interactions and influence of the United States. In addition, it is necessary to maintain harmonisation between China and Taiwan. This intention is to urge Taiwan to take an approach through persuasive negotiations to get the attention of the United States. Besides that, it also aims to push Taiwan's closeness to China towards treat actions that affect policies and future of the two countries. The three countries have a determination mechanism and political leader. This then illustrates that, when the United States decides to intervene in Taiwan, it must be through negotiation and correct decisions through diplomacy in order to obtain a ratification in the aspects of the economy, military and political system. When the United States intervenes from an economic context, there is a relationship of cooperation and political ratification of the system. It encourages cohesiveness and interdependence between Taiwan and the United States which intends to make China worry about taking rare policies to apply political interests. The authority possessed by the three international players certainly has interests which can become the principle for intervening with each other. The United States backed up Taiwan by participating in the World of Health Assembly (WHA) as an

observer from 2009-2016 (Romberg, 2014). In this context, Washington expressed a warm attitude in justifying the needs of each country.

In 1985, the United States accounted for just over 48 percent of Taiwan's total export to the world, but this ratio dropped to 12 percent in 2015. Nevertheless, Taiwan is still the ninth largest goods trading partner for the United States with 63.74 billion USD in total commodity trade in 2015. Two-way trade in services totaled 20.3 billion USD, with 4.7 billion USD trade surplus in favor of the United States in the same year (Chow et al., 2017). According to Department of Commerce, the United States exports of goods and services to Taiwan supported an estimated 217,000 jobs in 2014 (Chow et al., 2017). Besides trade relations, Washington and Taipei are deepening their relations with scientific, technological and cultural exchanges and also agreed on several bilateral agreements and memorandums of understanding to promote and regulate relations between both countries.

China's Policy Toward the United States

Several factors explain the changing behavior of China's foreign policy. One of them is the establishment of the "Market System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" in 1992 by the Chinese Communist Party. It provides a predictable commitment to reforming market-oriented economies. Since then, the central government launched a series of massive reforms, including finance, banking, budgeting, taxation, trade, state-owned enterprises, and administrative organizations (Wong, 2001). President Clinton passed the United States-China Relations Act of 2001, which provided for Beijing's trade relations with the United States and paved the way for China to join the World Trade Organization in 2001. From 2002 to 2005, China fully implemented World Trade Organization

(WTO) commitments and effectively promoted well-designed, market-oriented and rules-based economic and trade liberalization, leading to significant improvements in the transparency of trade laws and regulations and management of trade policies (Bin, 2015).

China is taking steps to implement market access commitments according to the schedule set by the WTO, including reducing tariffs, removing non-tariff barriers, and expanding market access services for foreign providers. In particular, China binds all tariffs including the Most Favorable Nations (MFN) tariffs which is set to fall from an average of 15.6 percent in 2001 to 9.7 percent in 2005. With a decrease in tariffs for manufactured goods from 14.3 percent to 8.9 percent and several sectors such as manufacturing, automotive and auto parts, textiles and clothing, and Information Technology products, they experienced a significant reduction in tariffs. In terms of non-tariff barriers, most import permits, import quotas and special tender requirements were removed before January 2005. China made a broad service liberalization commitment that is unusual with the developing country average. This covers more than 100 over 160 sectors on the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS) list, especially in areas of large commercial significance such as banking, securities, insurance, telecommunications, retail services and distribution (Chen & Whalley, 2014).

China's trade liberalization reform momentum has slowed since 2006, due to domestic criticism of China's weakness in the WTO and a lack of consensus within the Chinese government on market-oriented economic reform priorities, particularly on how to deal with state-owned enterprises. During this period, the average tariff was not significantly reduced. However, more tariff quotas were abolished and in 2008 only very limited items, such as grain, sugar, wool,

cotton and fertilizers, were subject to tariff quota restrictions. With the reshuffle of trade barriers in China's export market after accession to the WTO, China's exports increased rapidly, and therefore led to a huge increase in the trade surplus. The share of the current account surplus to GDP reached its historical peak of 11 percent in 2007. In 2011, the United States trade deficit with China increased from 273.1 billion USD in 2010 to 295.5 billion USD. This increase accounted for three-quarters of the growth in the United States trade deficit. In March, Washington submitted a request for a consultation with China at the WTO on its restrictions on exporting metal. The United States and its allies argue China's quotas violate international trade norms (Choukroune, 2012).

In 2014, the United States court charged five Chinese hackers with alleged links to the Chinese people's liberation army for stealing trading technology from the United States' company. Washington reveals evidence that Chinese hackers are behind the information theft breach of twenty-two million federal employees at this time (Williams, 2014). In March 2018, the United States Vice-president Mike Pence delivered a speech about the Trump administration's policies towards China and the significant hardening of the United States' position. Mike Pence said Washington would prioritize competition over cooperation by using tariffs to combat "economic aggression". The Trump administration announces massive tariffs on Chinese imports, valued at 50 billion USD, in White House accusations of China's theft of the United States technology and intellectual property. After importing steel and aluminum, the measures targeted goods including clothing and some Chinese investment in the United States. Instead, China imposed retaliatory measures on various United States products, which ultimately sparked fears of a trade war

between the world's largest economies (Perlez, 2018).

The Trump administration has again raised tariffs from 10 to 25 percent on 200 billion USD worth of Chinese goods. China retaliated by announcing plans to increase tariffs on the United States goods worth 60 billion USD. Trump believes the high fees imposed by the tariffs will force China to forge a deal that benefits the United States. Then, the Trump administration banned the United States companies from using foreign-made telecommunications equipment that could threaten national security, a move believed to target Huawei. The dynamics of the nearly two-year trade war between the United States and China finally found a trade agreement. The deal eases some of the United States tariffs on Chinese imports and binds China to purchase an additional 200 billion USD worth of American goods, including agricultural products and cars over the course of two years and China has also pledged to enforce intellectual property protection (Swanson, 2022).

China's Policy Towards Taiwan

The conditions of anarchy in the international system are of course very diverse from countries that have power in various fields. China is categorized as a major power. But it is not surprising if other countries also have power as a threat in seeing China's strength and its existence in the global stage. In this case, China's role through domestic and foreign policy is very diverse with its national principles. The implementation of China's policies for Taiwan cannot be separated from the influence and interaction. These two things will become a pattern in carrying out Chinese activities to influence policies towards Taiwan (Glaser, 2016).

In the international context, there are several China's policy strategy towards Taiwan (Wu, 2013), such as (i) China will

create better relations with the United States so as to reduce the United States support for Taiwan; (ii) China has always created and built strong alliances with Russia to limit the interaction and influence of the United States in carrying out its principle mechanisms and directing the United States' political strategy to the Asian region, which is referred to as a cross-strategy issue; and (iii) China will make and choose risk-contingency with the first option, namely indirect-balancing, in which China will make enhanced military efforts to overcome the threatening state uncertainty, indirect-balancing refers to informal military action.

China's always updating the concept of an approach in carrying out policies to meet Beijing's interests and refers to China's national principles but it is undeniable that the foreign policy is certainly influenced by aspects of interaction. The interaction aspect is seen in the birth of a policy that can be carried out by China, in which the Taiwan issue regarding the cross-strategy certainly has an impact on China's domestic policy. Beijing's domestic policy is focused on improving the year framework concept as a form of mapping of a country that can be understood as a policy that will be pushed through agreements and ratifications in any field to carry out the foreign policy strategy. In carrying out interactions that can help to find solutions, some approaches can be taken by China such as political communication. In this case, China and Taiwan have always placed suspicions on each other. However, the initiative pushed by China is to create political interactions, thereby reducing Taiwan's suspicion. Furthermore, China has sensitive talks with Taiwan, such as confidence-building measures (CBM) and communication on political talks.

China's capacity has always reflected Beijing's existence in facing the presence of the United States. Politically, Beijing maintains very good relations with Taiwan and the United States. In domestic

policy, countries that have big powers like China certainly have conflict management and have strategies in dealing with domestic and international problems. China with the “influence and interaction” approach certainly has a negotiation strategy. What is then interesting is the problem with Taiwan’s attitude that China does not take a hard power approach. Taiwan has always been in a bandwagoning position. It is inconvenient for China if the relationship between the United States and Taiwan has continuous coordination from an economic aspect. Where this analysis is based on the concept of balance of threat, China has offensive power which refers to a combination of aggregate strength, geographical proximity to Taiwan and the potential for aggressive action. The greater size of China’s offensive power, the more significant threats that arise from various countries, such as the United States.

Looking on China’s policy towards Taiwan of course makes Taipei choose and position the risk-contingency option, namely the option that is targeted and chosen by Taiwan to reduce the risk of China’s threat and the United States. Threats occur towards an economic or military aspect. This is then the approach China will take as a country that tries to promote influence and interaction with Taiwan. So it does not rule out if China’s soft power conditions can put Taiwan in a balancing position. But Taiwan will prefer to cooperate with China as a policy to reduce risk and also choose to cooperate with countries that are not a source of threat. When China and the United States have taken a rare political turn to intervene, Taiwan certainly has a chance to negotiate. However, on a favorable basis, Taiwan repositioned itself and opted for re-maximization, in which Taiwan would state its stance, in this case the option to maximize the benefits of the aggressive power of China and the United States.

China and the United States Perception Towards Taiwan

China and the United States understand the Taiwan issue from a different perspective. Since the beginning, China has always viewed Taiwan as an integral part of its territory that cannot be separated from its jurisdictions. However, the historical experience of Taiwan is different from that of mainland China, making Taiwan unable to be managed in the same way as the mainland, so the Chinese government implemented a “One Country, Two Systems” policy (Cabestan, 2016). Meanwhile, the United States has never considered Taiwan as part of China. To Washington, Taiwan is not China, Taiwan is Taiwan, its political economy and socio-cultural system cannot be equated with China. Such views have been shaped in the mindset of the United States policymakers since World War II (Lin, 2020). Therefore, any form of interference from China to Taiwan must be contained by the United States. Washington interests in East Asia reinforce policies to protect Taiwan. Differences in views have made China and the United States relations often tense. However, the two countries continued to maintain harmonious relations between them by refraining from escalating into open conflict.

The history of Sino-the United States relations on the Taiwan issue stems from Washington support for the Nationalist government in the face of Japanese aggression on mainland China in the early 1940s. At the same time, Mainland China was engulfed in a civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists. Even though the United States was fully aware that the Nationalist government was corrupt and not supported by most of the Chinese people, but for ideological reasons, the United States continues to support the Nationalists to prevent the spread of

communism (Xiao, 2001). As a result, when the Communist Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the Nationalist government and forming the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the United States decided to support the new government formed by the Nationalist group in Taiwan. The purpose of this support is to prevent the Communist Revolution from spreading throughout the world. Taiwan was used as a tool to achieve the United States' goal of containment of the spread of communism with foreign assistance reaching millions of US dollars.

The Korean War, which took place on June 25, 1950, was a momentum to direct the United States involvement in securing Taiwan. The war lasted until 1953 for the United States to change its strategy in the Taiwan Strait. Washington, which was originally passive, became active because it was concerned that Beijing's involvement would encourage the spread of communist ideology (Bush, 2003). In addition, Washington was worried that the Korean War would result in China's aggressiveness to occupy Taiwan. Furthermore, the United States President Harry Truman deployed Fleet VII to the Taiwan Strait and the China-Korea border. China saw this action as an invasion of its territorial sovereignty, so China sent its troops to Korea. In response to this, on December 8, 1950, the United States announced an economic embargo on China and it ended in 1971 (Tucker, 2009; Wang, 2006).

During the embargo period, Taiwan was used by the United States as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" to fight China with its communist revolution which was seen as a threat to Western capitalism. While the United States and China were enemies for two decades (1950-1971), the United States and Taiwan relations grew closer. This is indicated by the United States economic assistance to Taiwan reaching 2.2 billion USD. In addition, the United States provided military assistance to Taiwan

amounting to 3.19 billion USD (Hu, 2000). Washington assistance further strengthened economic stability as well as the legitimacy of the Nationalist government in the early days of moving to Taiwan. In 1951-1965, the United States distributed financial assistance of 100 million USD to Taiwan each year. Through this assistance, Washington played a major role in increasing economic growth and strengthening its influence in Taiwan (Wang, 2006).

The close relationship between the Taiwanese and the United States troops was strengthened by the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty in December 1954, making Taiwan highly dependent on the United States and pushing Washington to become increasingly involved in the Taiwan Strait conflict (Lin, 2013). China accuses the United States-Taiwan defense agreement, placing Taiwan under the United States protection as an invasion of Chinese territory and a scenario to permanently separate Taiwan from China. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States changed its strategy by moving closer to China to keep up with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. After the Soviet Union collapsed, in the early 1990s the United States again used Taiwan to counter China's rise. Nevertheless, both sides tried not to stir up hostilities in order to prevent war from happening (Wang, 2006). For the Taiwan issue, the United States needs to carefully map out how to achieve its goals without confronting China's interests. Furthermore, Washington should maintain a military presence by supporting Taiwan's defenses to prevent attacks while convincing Beijing that its weapons sales objectives and military presence are not aimed at supporting the separation between Taiwan and China (Chen, 2017).

Throughout the 1970s, the United States under the administrations of Richard Nixon (1969-1974) and Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) began to put the Taiwan issue aside and decided to approach China to stem

Soviet influence in the Cold War (Bush, 2003). On one occasion, Richard Nixon even said that “good relationship with China was more important than good relationship with the Soviet Union” (Mann, 1999). Therefore, after China’s seat on the United Nation Security Council was occupied by the Nationalist government, the Communist government took over in 1971, the United States transferred its sovereignty from Taipei to Beijing. Washington’s support for China’s sovereignty was shown by Richard Nixon during his visit to Beijing in 1972. This historic visit resulted in the Shanghai Communique agreement, one of which states “the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China” (Hu, 2000). The peak of improvement between China-the United States relations occurred in 1979 when the two countries agreed to normalize diplomatic relations. Since then, the relations between the two countries have continued to improve even though they have fundamental differences (Wang, 2006).

The Taiwan issue remains an obstacle to China and the United States relations. Moreover, when Washington government normalized diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979, the United States Congress counterbalanced by passing the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) on April 10, 1979. In TRA, it is said that “Washington would maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people in Taiwan” (TRA, 1979). This policy makes the issue of Taiwan even more complicated and complex because on the one hand the United States recognizes the One-China Policy according to the Shanghai Communique, but on the other hand the United States is obliged to protect Taiwan based on the mandate of the TRA (Yang, 2014). Responding to the ratification of the

TRA, China raised its objection and questioned the United States commitment (Tucker, 2009). After normalization, China and the United States relations can be said to be harmonious and prone to conflict due to differences in attitudes towards the Taiwan issue. When Ronald Reagan was President of the United States (1981-1989), he made frequent statements of support for Taiwan. Reagan criticized President Jimmy Carter’s policy of normalizing relations with China as a surrender to Beijing, not a victory of diplomacy. Reagan explained that to restore diplomatic relations with the United States, China should recognize Taiwan’s independence (Tucker, 2009).

Reagan’s pro-Taiwan policies were continued by his successor, George H. W. Bush (1989-1993), by arming the Taiwan military. After the Cold War, Washington continued to sell weapons to Taipei. During 1990-2007, Washington played a major role in strengthening the ability of the Taiwanese army to control not only the Taiwan Strait but also the Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone (TADIZ). In the same period, the democratization process began to be pushed by President Lee Teng-Hui, thus encouraging the pro-independence movement in Taiwan (Wang, 2006). Therefore, the United States is increasingly supporting Taiwan with its close relationship between the two. President Lee Teng-Hui’s visit to the United States is embodied in a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University, on June 7, 1996. Throughout history, this is the first visit of a Taiwanese president to the United States. In his speech, Lee Teng-Hui urged China to follow the democratic model developed by Taiwan. The Doctor of agricultural economics, graduated from Cornell University (1968), emphasized that Taiwan is a sovereign country, not just the successor to the Qing dynasty which was overthrown by the Nationalists in 1911. China responded to Lee Teng-Hui’s visit with great anger. Beijing accuses the Bill

Clinton administration (1993-2000) of deliberately using Taiwan to undermine China, politically and economically.

As a result, China withdrew its ambassador from the United States, canceled the defense minister's state visit to Washington, postponed a meeting on arms control with the United States delegation, ended cross-strait dialogue, and refused to approve a new United States Ambassador. The most stressful thing was that China deployed its military force to the Taiwan Strait, resulting in a regional crisis (Tucker, 2009). Quickly, the United States sent two warships to protect Taiwan. A war did not happen, but the tensions in the Taiwan Strait reflect the uncertainty of China-the United States relations. Washington action appears to be merely intended as a symbolic message to China, such as (i) the United States is consistent in maintaining the existence of Taiwan through strengthening its armed forces, and (ii) Taiwan is the United States strategic partner to maintain regional stability while safeguarding Washington's interests in the Western Pacific (Yang, 2014).

Recognizing the dangers of the United States intervention, after 1996, China accelerated weapons modernization by placing Taiwan as the main target. China is shifting from deterrent to coercive strategy. The purchase of war equipment from Russia was significantly increased. At the same time, the United States arms sales to Taiwan were increasing. Washington is committed to strengthening Taiwan's military so that it is able to defend itself from possible Chinese attacks, so Taipei has high confidence in negotiating with Beijing (Tucker, 2009). Besides standing by in the Taiwan Strait, China began to develop closer ties with the United States through "new type of great power relations" launched in October 2009. In line with the new pattern of mutually beneficial relations, in February 2012, Vice President Xi Jinping visited the United

States and declared that China and the United States should establish "a new type of great power relations" which is unprecedented and informs the future". Three months later, in the Fourth of the United States and China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), President Hu Jintao said that "advance mutually beneficial" and "win-win cooperation" as pillar from "new type of great power relations". In a meeting with President Barack Obama in June 2013, Xi Jinping who replaced Hu Jintao as president summarized the substance of "new type of great power relations" in three concepts, namely (i) neither a confrontation nor conflict; (ii) mutual respect; and (iii) win-win cooperation (Lu, 2014).

However, China's initiative to develop a new pattern of closer relations has not deterred the United States from arming Taiwan. In September 2011, the United States and Taiwan agreed to a 5.9 billion USD F-16 aircraft modernization package (Lowther, 2011). For the United States, selling these weapons will increase the "survivability, reliability and combat capability" of the Taiwanese army. The United States believes that this policy contributes to the stability of the Taiwan Strait. However, the Deputy Prime Minister of China, Zhang Zhijun strongly protested and stated that "the wrong attitude by the United States side will inevitably undermine bilateral relations as well as exchanges and co-operation in military and security areas" (Zhao, 2011). Zhang Zhijun added that "China strongly urges the United States to be fully aware of the high sensitivity and serious harm of the issue, seriously treat the solemn stance of China, honour its commitment and immediately cancel the wrong decision".

Hickey (2014) argues that the United States continues its security relationship with Taiwan for six reasons. First, the United States remains committed to running TRA

and ensuring Taiwan has a strong defense capability. Second, arms sales are needed to keep pace with China's increasing military budget. Third, the democratization of Taiwan encourages the United States to protect Taipei. Fourth, arms sales to promote cross-strait reconciliation because it allows for equal bargaining power between Taipei and Beijing. Fifth, the United States wants to prove that Taiwan really appreciates a commitment so that it is expected to increase credibility for other regional alliance countries. And sixth, the United States views arms sales as not a violation of the Shanghai Communique because Beijing has deployed 1,400 ballistic missiles to intimidate Taiwan. In addition, Hickey (2014) also argues that in contrast China sees arms sales in six views. First, arms sales are a form of intervention and could threaten China's sovereignty. Second, arms sales distort prospects for peace by reducing Taipei's initiative to negotiate. Third, arms sales further strengthened the pro-independence movement. Fourth, arms sales will not increase Taiwan's confidence in negotiating with China because when a similar policy was implemented in 2001, there was no significant progress in cross-Strait relations. Fifth, it should reduce arms sales according to its promise, the United States has actually violated this promise by selling weapons of up to 50 billion USD since 1979. And sixth, weapons from the United States will not have an impact on the balance of power between Taiwan and China.

In the future, the United States is likely to send weapons to Taiwan regardless of objections from China. Washington is trying to maintain the status quo by exploiting the advantages of the problems in the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, the United States supports Taiwan's political developments, including taking advantage of the profits from arms sales to ward off China's rise. On the other hand, the United States wants to maintain peace in Asia by

avoiding actual war in the Taiwan Strait. So far, the United States has managed to balance the two goals. However, if not managed properly, the conflict will lead to a major war in Asia.

Conclusion

International relations are always occupied by countries that have variations that carry strategic concepts from different countries. The presence of the state in international relations undoubtedly adorns an anarchist atmosphere which is a concern for countries. The Southeast Asian region to the European continent has certainly become a focus place for the major powers. Geopolitically, Taiwan has problems that are of concern to interested countries. Starting from the very complex issue of Taiwan, of course, it cannot be separated from various countries that have national interests. In this case, Taiwan and major power other than China, namely the United States of course, become a means of protecting countries that do not have the power to maintain conflict and the existence of power.

The international system is always adorned with various polemics that are difficult to resolve. It cannot be denied that Taiwan and the United States have a very strategic and comprehensive relationship from economic, military and geopolitical aspects. It would be inconvenient for China to have the relationship between the United States and Taiwan have continuous coordination from an economic aspect. Through cooperation and mutual interest, the United States backed up Taiwan in participating in the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer from 2009-2016... In this context, Washington expresses a warm attitude in upholding the needs of each country.

China and the United States keep the issue of Taiwan in a status quo because it benefits both countries. With the "One

Country, Two Systems” policy, Beijing strongly influences Taiwan, especially after the CSSTA has been agreed. The pro-China policies supported by the KMT government are a guarantee that Taiwan will continue to maintain close ties with China. Thus, China does not need to force Taiwan to reunify. Because, if that happens, the United States will respond harshly and threaten interference. For Washington, the current situation is still very favorable because it can still control Taiwan with economic and military assistance based on the Taiwan Relation Act (TRA). In the status quo, Beijing and Washington try to avoid open conflict and end up in war. For both countries, regional stability is essential to secure their strategic interests. A stable East Asian region can potentially increase the volume of trade between the two countries. Therefore, despite having experienced an arms crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, China and the United States remain harmonious. Thus, a future war is unlikely.

The balance of threat theory gives perspective on the dynamics of the two rivalries of the United States and China across the Taiwan Strait. The theory helps explain the role of the United States in composing the balance of threat in the issue and how the country could maintain that position in the area. The different interests between the United States and China on claiming Taiwan’s sovereignty make both countries look for ways to reach a balance of power. In addition, Beijing and Washington have not stopped trying to put Taipei into their orbit of influence that will result in conflict. Similar to the great imperialist powers of the past, the two countries view Taiwan as a strategic area. Its geographic position between East and Southeast Asia does not only make it a potential fortress, but also as an economic base in Asia. As a result, the United States continues to provide economic and military assistance to Taiwan. Meanwhile, China continues modernizing

its weapons and liberalizing trade relations with Taiwan.

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SỰ ĐỐI ĐẦU GIỮA HOA KỲ - TRUNG QUỐC VÀ TÁC ĐỘNG LÊN MỐI QUAN HỆ GIỮA WASHINGTON - BẮC KINH VỚI LỊCH SỬ PHỨC TẠP CỦA ĐÀI LOAN

Sigit¹, Chindy Agata Bosawer², Rachel Shannon Twigivanya²

¹ *Nghiên cứu sinh ngành Quan hệ quốc tế, Nghiên cứu khu vực Châu Á – Thái Bình Dương,
Đại học Quốc lập Đông Hoa, Đài Loan*

² *Trợ lý nghiên cứu, Ngành Quan hệ quốc tế, Khoa Khoa học xã hội và chính trị,
Đại học Christian Indonesia, Indonesia*

Tóm tắt: Sử dụng thuyết Cân bằng mối đe dọa và phương pháp nghiên cứu định tính, bài viết này tập trung phân tích những tác động của sự đối đầu Mỹ-Trung lên mối quan hệ của hai nước này đối với lịch sử phức tạp của Đài Loan. Cả Hoa Kỳ và Trung Quốc đều có quan điểm khác nhau về vấn đề Đài Loan. Trung Quốc coi Đài Loan trong lịch sử là một phần của mình. Tuy nhiên, việc Đài Loan tan rã khiến một số người dân nước này không cảm thấy mình là một phần của Trung Quốc. Hoa Kỳ sau đó đã lợi dụng điều này để can thiệp và mở rộng ảnh hưởng ở khu vực Đông Á từ những năm 1950. Từ đó, lãnh thổ Đài Loan trở thành chiến trường để Hoa Kỳ và Trung Quốc tranh giành tầm ảnh hưởng trong khu vực. Đạo luật Quan hệ Đài Loan (TRA) năm 1979 tạo khung pháp lý để Washington tiếp tục bán vũ khí cho Đài Loan. Mặt khác, Bắc Kinh đã chủ động mở cửa thị trường tự do với Đài Bắc theo Hiệp định Thương mại dịch vụ xuyên eo biển (CSSTA) vào năm 2013. Bài viết này gợi ý Bắc Kinh và Washington kiềm chế để không leo thang thành một cuộc xung đột mở dẫn đến chiến tranh. Do đó, một cuộc chiến tranh trong tương lai là điều khó có thể xảy ra.

Từ khóa: Đạo luật Quan hệ Đài Loan của Hoa Kỳ, Hiệp định Thương mại dịch vụ xuyên eo biển của Trung Quốc, Đài Loan, lịch sử phức tạp, Đông Á